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CARL KNIGHT 
 
JUSTICE FOR FOXES* 
 
ABSTRACT. Ronald Dworkin maintains that value is unitary, in the sense that different values 
do not conflict. This article resists this ‘hedgehog’ view with reference to the values of equality 
and utility. These appear to yield conflicting prescriptions in cases where one possible 
distribution gives different individuals the same amount of advantage, and the other contains an 
unequal distribution of a greater overall amount of advantage. Hedgehogs might respond to such 
a case in two ways. First, they might claim that equality and utility are not truly in conflict. 
However, this claim seems implausible on our ordinary concepts of these values, and Dworkin 
does not provide grounds for revising our concepts. Second, they might deny that one of these 
values—utility—is a genuine value. However, one of the two aspects of Dworkin’s fundamental 
principle of equal concern appears to be supportive of utility, and he offers no good arguments for 
his preferred strategy of accommodating this aspect of equal concern within the value of equality. 
Furthermore, the alternative ‘fox’ view, which recognizes equality and utility as conflicting 
values, each accommodating one aspect of equal concern, has the advantage that it stays truer to 
familiar moral concepts. 
 
Moral, political and legal decision-making is strongly responsive to value judgments. 
Where an agent recognizes some action as furthering a value, they have a reason to 
perform that action. In considering which course of action to follow, an agent does then 
                                                 
* This article is in press, as of June 2015, at Law and Philosophy 
(http://www.springer.com/law/journal/10982). 
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immediately face two questions. First, which things count as values? And second, can 
values conflict? Fundamental disagreements about public policy are often grounded in 
contrasting answers to these questions (and the further question of how to resolve value 
conflicts if they do arise). Addressing these conceptual questions may then have great 
practical importance, as a large literature in moral, political, and legal philosophy 
recognizes. 
In his last major work, Justice for Hedgehogs, Ronald Dworkin decisively 
answered the second question in the negative.1 His main claim is that value is unitary, in 
the sense that its different components complement each other rather than conflict. He 
endorses what he calls “full value holism—the hedgehog’s faith that all true values form 
an interlocking network, that each of our convictions about what is good or right or 
beautiful plays some role in supporting each of our other convictions in each of these 
domains of value.”2 This holism requires that “there are no genuine conflicts in value.”3 
Dworkin’s primary conceptual resource in support of the thesis of the unity of 
value is his account of values as being ‘interpretative concepts’. On this account, the 
meaning of any given value can only be established by examining other values. As 
Dworkin puts it, 
 
a defense of some particular conception of a political value like equality or liberty 
must draw on values beyond itself. … We cannot defend a conception of any of 
                                                 
1 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
2 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 120. 
3 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 119. 
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them without showing how our conception fits with and into appealing 
conceptions of the others. That fact provides an important part of the case for the 
unity of value.4 
 
Presumably Dworkin does not here mean to say that conceptions of values must 
draw on other values in the specific sense that they must not conflict with them. Were 
that the case, his interpretative concept view of values could not “be an important part of 
the case for the unity of value,” as it would include the unity of value among its premises. 
He must rather mean that we take into account other values when developing our 
conception of a particular value, and that it is only once we do this that it becomes 
apparent that values do not conflict. 
I broadly accept this interpretative concept approach to value. But as William 
Edmundson has commented, “one might worry, Is there any reason to assume that the 
best interpretation of something will render that thing as a unified whole, especially if the 
‘package of purposes’ attributed to it is rich and diverse?”5 I argue that, once we consider 
how to describe each of two major distributive justice values, in light of the role of the 
other value, it becomes apparent that we can readily conceive of them as conflicting. That 
is, among values, there are (at least) two that conflict, given the role each plays in relation 
to the other. 
                                                 
4 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 7; see also Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 1986), chs 1-2. 
5 William A. Edmundson, “Book Review: Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs,” Law and Philosophy, 
31 (2012), 759-767, p. 763. 
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One of these values is equality. It is concerned with reducing differences in 
advantage levels between the well off and the badly off. I make no assumptions about the 
kind of advantage with which equality is concerned; candidates include welfare, 
resources, and capabilities.6 I also set aside choice and responsibility. Those who find 
arguments for equality convincing only where individuals’ responsibility has been 
equivalently exercised can simply assume that it has been so exercised in my examples.7 
The other value is concerned with social maximization, which may be interpreted 
as achieved by the highest total amount of advantage, by the highest average of 
advantage, or in some other way.8 Dworkin refers to this value when mentioning the 
“familiar idea in political theory that a just society will make some compromise between 
efficiency and distribution.”9 Elsewhere in this passage Dworkin is explicit that he is 
describing a conflict between utilitarianism and egalitarianism, and efficiency is often 
used to refer to non-advantage maximizing concepts (such as Pareto optimality), so I will 
refer to the value in question as utility. I will, however, interpret that value quite broadly. 
                                                 
6 The typically greater marginal utility of benefits for the worse off compared to the better off will tend to 
make real world inequalities more pronounced when measured in welfare rather than resources. This has no 
bearing on the examples I use, which should be interpreted as referring only to whichever measure of 
advantage the reader favours. 
7 It should therefore not be complained that my value of equality would reward those who deliberately 
develop expensive tastes. See Richard J. Arneson, “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,” 
Philosophical Studies, 56 (1989), 77-93; G. A. Cohen, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics, 99 
(1989), 906-44. Dworkin inspired these ‘luck egalitarians’, but refuses to describe himself as a luck 
egalitarian; see “Equality, Luck and Hierarchy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31 (2003), 190-8, p. 191. 
8 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University, 1984), part IV. 
9 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 54. 
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Though my value of utility is characterized by its maximization of advantage, advantage 
need not be construed in welfarist terms, as the most familiar utilitarian theories interpret 
it. It might be welfare, or alternatively resources, capabilities, or whatever is thought to 
be important.10 I also do not, and need not, resolve a tricky internal interpretative issue 
for utilitarians: the difference between average and total utilitarianism is only felt where 
population size varies, and it is stable in my examples. 
In order to defeat the hedgehog’s thesis, and substantiate the rival ‘fox’ thesis that 
values, even on their best interpretations, can come into conflict with each other, we need 
only show that a rather weak kind of value conflict is possible. I have in mind conflicts of 
pro tanto reasons for action.11 One value provides us with a pro tanto reason for acting in 
one way, the other value provides us with a pro tanto reason for acting in a second way, 
and we cannot act in both ways.12 That such a conflict between equality and utility is 
possible seems obvious. Consider this example: 
 
Equality versus utility: two distributions are available, one of which secures two 
units of advantage for each half of the population, the other of which secures one 
                                                 
10 Hence those impressed by arguments to the effect that utilitarianism as usually conceived relies on some 
dubious conception of welfare (see, for instance, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: 
Duckworth, 1978), pp. 233-8; Sovereign Virtue, ch. 1) cannot object to my value of utility on that score. 
11 See Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), ch. 7. 
12 One plausible basis for these conflicting pro tanto reasons are conflicting judgments of value, which are 
central to Joseph Raz’s definition of value conflict; see his The Practice of Value (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 44; cf. Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), pp. 86-7 
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unit of advantage for a worse-off half of the population and five units of 
advantage for the better-off half.  
 
Assuming (as I do) that the population size is stable and that the advantages of the better 
off are not traceable to their choices, equality is uncontroversially best furthered by the 
first distribution, because it is equal.13 Utility is uncontroversially best furthered by the 
second distribution, because it contains more advantage for society (and a higher average 
advantage level). As equality gives us a pro tanto reason for selecting one distribution, 
utility gives us a pro tanto reason for selecting the other, and we cannot have both, these 
values are in conflict. 
Furthermore, when we are conceptualizing equality, the fact that its 
recommendation conflicts with utility’s gives us no obvious reason to revise our 
conceptualization. Similarly, when we are conceptualizing utility, the fact that its 
recommendation conflicts with equality’s gives us no obvious reason to revise our 
conceptualization. As Dworkin acknowledges, legal and political philosophers routinely 
treat these two interpretative concepts as conflicting. 
 That this pro tanto conception of conflict is weak is brought out by comparison 
with two alternative conceptions. First, my sense does not imply that anyone who 
endorses conflicting values must face indeterminacy. Dworkin understands 
indeterminacy as holding “not that some particular act is neither forbidden nor required, 
                                                 
13 The first distribution is also better for the worst off in absolute terms. Thus, any readers who might reject 
the value of equality, understood as a view concerned with relative advantage levels, in favour of a focus 
on the absolute advantage levels of the worst off, as Rawls’ difference principle suggests, can nevertheless 
agree that there is a conflict in values in this and similar examples presented later in the article. 
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but that there is no correct answer to the question whether it is forbidden or whether it is 
required.”14 My claim is not that, where equality and utility conflict, there is necessarily 
no correct answer as to what we should do. I make only the weaker claim that equality 
and utility give rise to mutually incompatible pro tanto reasons. As these are pro tanto 
reasons, there may be no problem with resolving the conflict determinately.15 A position 
intermediate between straightforward resolution and indeterminacy is what Dworkin calls 
“uncertainty,” which applies where considerations on each side seem finely balanced and 
one takes “no view of the matter.”16 I do not take a stand on which of these three 
positions to take. Whether or not value conflicts can be resolved, their existence would 
make trouble for the hedgehog. 
                                                 
14 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, pp. 88-9. Indeterminacy seems to be implied by what Robert Talisse 
refers to as metaphysical pluralism; see his Pluralism and Liberal Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). 
15 There is a diversity of views about how this might be done. Some, such as James Griffin, see value 
pluralism as consistent with commensurability; see “Incommensurability: What’s the Problem?” in Ruth 
Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1997). Others, like William Galston, argue that we can choose between even 
incommensurable values on reasonable grounds; see his Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 35; see also Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values, ch. 7. George Crowder 
further distinguishes between particularist and universalist approaches to choosing between conflicting 
values; see Liberalism and Value Pluralism (London: Continuum), ch. 3. For discussion of trade-offs 
among reasons for action, see Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), ch. 3. 
16 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 91. Dworkin’s ‘uncertainty’ roughly corresponds to Talisse’s 
preferred epistemic pluralism. 
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Second, though I say equality and utility conflict, that does not mean that, 
whatever we do, we do some wrong. Isaiah Berlin, who brought the fox/hedgehog 
terminology to prominence, combines his foxy position with the view that the conflict of 
value leaves (in Dworkin’s words) “an irredeemable moral stain” and that we must 
sometimes choose “not whether to wrong a group, but which group to wrong.”17 But 
though Dworkin only discusses foxy views which have this ‘tragic’ character, it is 
evidently quite detachable from the recognition of value conflict itself. A non-tragic 
alternative suggests that, if we bring one of the distributions in equality versus utility 
about, after due consideration of the reasons presented by equality, utility, and any other 
relevant values, we can quite plausibly hold that we do no wrong, though we inevitably 
do not promote one value as it conflicts with another.18 Our obligations extend only to the 
possible. I again take no stance here, and only mention this non-tragic view to show that, 
if the tragic view is indeed mistaken, we need not rush to accept Dworkin’s value holism. 
But is there such a thing as value conflict? Examples such as equality versus 
utility cannot be batted away by appeal to the fact that values are interpretative, as the 
conflict they present is familiar and fits with our wider conceptual scheme. Dworkin must 
then appeal to conceptual resources other than, or in addition to, his main idea that values 
are interpretative concepts. He might take one of two strategies in order to preserve the 
thesis of the unity of value. First, he might deny that the conflict is genuine, by arguing 
                                                 
17 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 109; see also 
Isaiah Berlin, Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
18 This view seems to arise quite naturally from Dworkin’s powerful objection to Berlin that he would 
require that there is something wrong in preventing murder, as it is a restriction on Berlin’s idea of liberty; 
see Dworkin, Justice in Robes, pp. 115-6. 
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(for it cannot, on pain of circularity, be assumed) that values, qua interpretative concepts, 
respond to other values in such a way that value conflict is impossible. Second, he might 
deny that one or other of the putatively conflicting values really is a value. The second of 
these strategies appears to be favoured by Dworkin, as he does not appear to believe that 
utility is a value. Given this, it is unsurprising that Dworkin does not attempt to show that 
equality and utility are compatible, as the first strategy suggests; nevertheless, his 
comments regarding other values suggest the broad lines of a Dworkinian defence of the 
compatibility of equality and utility. I treat the first strategy, which denies the conflict 
between equality and utility, in the first part of this article, and the second strategy, which 
denies the value of utility, in the second part. I argue that, as neither strategy succeeds, 
equality and utility conflict. In the final part I complement these mostly defensive 
arguments with the positive claim that the fox’s conceptual scheme has an advantage 
over the hedgehog’s. 
 
I. IS THERE REALLY A CONFLICT? 
Richard Fallon suggests that, where your colleague solicits comments on a book 
manuscript, and you find it to be bad, you face a conflict between the values of honesty 
and kindness.19 This has at least a superficial similarity with my claimed conflict between 
equality and utility. It is therefore worth seeing whether Dworkin’s response to Fallon 
succeeds. 
                                                 
19 Richard Fallon, “Is Moral Reasoning Conceptual Interpretation?” Boston University Law Review, 90 
(2010), 535-550, p. 539. 
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Dworkin initially draws attention to the aforementioned distinction between 
uncertainty and indeterminacy.20 It could easily be the case that, say, honesty was the 
best policy in this case, but that it was just hard to know as much. As Dworkin 
acknowledges, this point does nothing to resolve the apparent conflict, so we can quickly 
set it aside. 
 Though Dworkin writes that “[i]t is … natural to say in a case like Fallon’s that 
we are torn between kindness and honesty” he holds that “[w]e might disagree, however, 
as to why it seems natural.”21 In support of this suggestion he suggests that our concepts 
of honesty and kindness are, as interpretative concepts, works-in-progress. They can both 
be satisfied in most cases, but in others, like this case, they are in tension with each other, 
and so we understandably report a conflict. But this shows only that the concepts we have 
been working with are not the finished article. We arrive at further refinement by asking 
questions such as “whether it is really cruel to tell an author the truth” and “whether it is 
really dishonest to tell him what it is in his interests to hear and no one’s interests to 
suppress.”22 
 Dworkin needs one more step of argument to establish the possibility of values 
not truly conflicting: he must offer reasons for thinking that our process of refining our 
values has the result that values do not conflict.23 But the suggestions Dworkin makes 
                                                 
20 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, pp. 118-19. 
21 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 119. 
22 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 119. 
23 A referee comments that “Dworkin might well hold that we, qua finite human beings with limited 
cognitive capacities, can never reach a level of insight in which all value conflicts are dissolved. However, 
counterfactually fully rational and well-informed agents might arrive at such a conclusion.” Gerald Gaus 
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here are problematic. He first asserts that “[w]e reinterpret our concepts to resolve our 
dilemma: the direction of our thought is towards unity, not fragmentation.”24 On the one 
hand, it may be that progress in thinking tends towards unity in the sense of coherence or 
consistency, but there is nothing incoherent or inconsistent in the thought that honesty 
and kindness might conflict. So a tendency towards unity in that weak sense cannot be 
used to support a movement away from conflicting concepts of honesty and kindness. On 
the other hand, it is not at all obvious that progress in thinking tends towards unity in 
Dworkin’s favoured ‘no inter-value conflict’ sense. Indeed, that is roughly what the 
argument under consideration is supposed to demonstrate, so it cannot serve as a premise. 
The reference to a dilemma may be intended to support this strong claim, but the 
dilemma is not such a threat that we should rework our moral concepts to avoid it. 
Situations in which we feel we can be honest or kind, but not both, are familiar parts of 
moral life.25 A non-conflicting conceptual scheme may, then, be unacceptably at odds 
                                                                                                                                                 
similarly argues that “given the complexity of our belief systems, it is, other things equal, always plausible 
to conjecture that any given disagreement is an instance of inconclusive reasoning.” See his Justificatory 
Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 155-6. That may be so, but the assertion that 
rational beings would accept the unity of value is prima facie no more plausible than the assertion that fully 
rational beings would accept value conflict. Dworkin would still need to offer reasons for thinking that 
fully rational beings would tend towards a unity rather than plurality of values. These reasons would take 
much the same shape as the reasons I consider later in this paragraph. 
24 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 119. 
25 Of course, the role of such intuitions in ethics is controversial; see, for instance, Peter Singer, “Ethics and 
Intuitions,” The Journal of Ethics, 9 (2005), 331-52; Folke Tersman, “The Reliability of Moral Intuitions,” 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86 (2008), 389-405. But Dworkin himself aims to build theories that 
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with our considered judgments.26 We might be suspicious that it overlooked something 
that mattered morally. 
The other way in which Dworkin tries to bolster the view that refinement removes 
conflict is through critique of the rival view that “[m]oral conflict is real, and any theory 
that denies this is false to moral reality.” This rival holds that the conflict between 
honesty and kindness “is not an illusion produced by incomplete moral interpretation; it 
is a matter of plain fact.”27 Dworkin objects that it is unclear what this plain fact could 
consist in, given that there are no moral particles to fix the content of value. But this 
objection relies on lumbering the rival view with unnecessary metaethical baggage. The 
relevant rival view need not take a stance on such issues and, as I have suggested, might 
even accept Dworkin’s position that moral concepts are interpretative concepts, a matter 
for substantive moral philosophy which takes into account the role of other concepts.28 It 
just says that moral concepts are properly construed as in principle open to conflict. 
 Against this view Dworkin claims that the concepts of honesty and kindness do 
not “have a precise and conflicting content just in virtue of linguistic practice.”29 He 
                                                                                                                                                 
are compatible with ordinary people’s understanding of ethics; see, for instance, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 289-
90.  
26 William Galston, The Practice of Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 
17. 
27 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 120. 
28 The “radical pluralism” of G. A. Cohen, which is “consistent with many views of the status of our 
fundamental convictions, including the view that they are noncognitive expressions of emotion or attitude,” 
is one form of the relevant view. See his Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), p. 4 n. 5. 
29 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 120. 
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contends that “[m]any people do believe that it would be an act of kindness to tell your 
colleague the truth. Or that it would not be dishonest, in this circumstance, to trim.”30 
The evidence Dworkin cites is insufficient to establish even that refinement of our 
conflicts leads away from conflict. First, and to repeat, the task before Dworkin is not to 
show that there are some cases in which an apparent value conflict dissolves under closer 
inspection. His claim is that values never conflict, so any case of genuine value conflict 
defeats his position. 
Second, even supposing that Dworkin’s claims about people’s beliefs were true, 
they would not really support even the possibility of honesty and kindness being in 
harmony. It is not enough just to observe what “[m]any people … believe” about values, 
as they might be mistaken about them. As Dworkin himself emphasizes, the correct 
interpretation of such arguments is a matter of moral argument, not mere head-
counting.31 
Finally, and bearing in mind the previous two points, Dworkin does not consider 
really difficult (and hence, most relevant) counterexamples to his position, such as 
equality versus utility. In the kindness and honesty case there is vagueness about whether 
the colleague is really harmed by the truth, such that some people may hold that telling 
the truth is simply ‘being cruel to be kind’. But in equality versus utility, there is no such 
vagueness—no one could claim that the equal outcome promoted utility or that the 
unequal outcome promoted equality. 
                                                 
30 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 120. 
31 See, for example, Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, pp. 170-1. 
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What might one who is minded to deny this conflict say? I will now briefly revisit 
the points Dworkin makes regarding honesty and kindness, to see if they fare any better 
as a way of resolving the equality and utility conflict. 
 The starting point of a Dworkinian attempt to reconcile equality and utility would 
be to treat our versions of these concepts as incomplete, and in need of refinement. We 
refine them by asking questions such as “is it really contrary to efficiency to favour four 
equally distributed units of welfare to six unequally distributed units?” or “is it really 
contrary to equality to prefer six unequally distributed units of welfare to four equally 
distributed units?” The problem for the Dworkinian is that such questions seem, if 
anything, more obviously to give rise to answers that show value conflict than did the 
honesty/kindness questions. At least assuming, as any attempt to reconcile the values of 
equality and utility assumes, that equality and utility are separate values,32 it seems clear 
that equality will not favour (unchosen) inequality over an equal distribution, and utility 
will not favour less advantage rather than more. 
What about the suggestions that I earlier said Dworkin offered for the refinement 
of values as a process that removes conflict? His initial assertion that “the direction of our 
thought is towards unity, not fragmentation” does, as before, either fail to challenge value 
conflict, assume rather than argue for its falsity, or argue for its falsity on the ground that 
we are so unsettled by the thought of two values pulling in different directions that we 
must revise one to fit with the other. This argument is no more plausible for equality and 
                                                 
32 The thought here is that, if one of these values were not a value, we might try to broaden the other value 
in an otherwise counterintuitive way in order to accommodate considerations traditionally associated with 
the other value. But as we are here assuming that both values actually are values, there is no motivation for 
a counterintuitive broadening of meaning. That assumption is relaxed in the next section. 
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utility than it was for honesty and kindness. It is routine to think that a distribution of 
benefits and burdens is good in one regard, but bad in another. If one country is rich, but 
unequal, and another country equal, but poor, it is natural to think that there is something 
good and something bad about both countries. If we reframed our concepts so that to say 
that a country was rich was to imply that it was equal, and vice versa, we would have lost 
clarity in our thinking. And, though it is harder to judge advantage levels empirically, the 
same conceptual point would follow from an attempt to say that an equal distribution was 
necessarily a distribution high in overall advantage, and vice versa. It is not value conflict 
but the absence of value conflict that is unsettling. We certainly have no reason to invent 
it, as Dworkin urges. 
There is, finally, a quite different argument specific to the distributive sphere that 
Dworkinians might offer for the unity of value.33 Suppose we all face a particular risk—
the risk of congenital disease, for example. This risk, when it materializes for some of us 
but not others, will cause an unchosen unequal distribution between us. Dworkin has long 
argued that we should correct for that unchosen inequality only to the extent that we 
would have insured against it under the equal background conditions of equal risk and an 
equal ability to purchase insurance.34 Under such equal background conditions, we may 
well decide that we would not want to purchase insurance that completely restores us to 
equality after risks materialize for us if that scheme would impose extreme costs on us in 
the form of insurance premiums. We may well prefer an insurance scheme that would 
compensate us to a lesser extent than what would be necessary to restore us to equality 
                                                 
33 The remainder of this paragraph is attributable, with only one minor change, to an anonymous referee. 
34 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, ch. 2. 
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with others. If the hypothetical insurance model is a plausible guide to what the value of 
equality requires, then, contrary to what I have argued, an efficient but unchosen 
inequality can be compatible with the value of equality. 
A major problem with this argument is that, in at least some cases, the 
hypothetical insurance market cannot be a plausible account of what both equality and 
utility require.35 Suppose that there is a one-in-a-hundred possibility of acquiring a 
congenital disease that requires expenditure of £100,000 per annum to secure basic 
mobility. This expenditure will not be retained or reinvested by society, though it does 
enable the income of the person with the disease to be increased from £1,000 per annum 
to £6,000 per annum as they will be able to work part time. Average contributions of 
£1010 per year from those ninety-nine in a hundred who do not acquire the disability 
would then be required to provide the disease expenditure. Average pre-contribution 
income is £10,000 per annum, usually enough for a welfare level of 10 units, and post-
contribution income would be £8,990 per annum, which is sufficient only for a welfare 
level of 9 units. As it happens, the person who develops the disease will have a low (5 
unit) level of welfare even if they are mobile, as they will still be very ill, though that is 
five times their welfare level if they are not mobile. To keep matters simple, I assume that 
the options come down either to insuring at the level described above, or not insuring at 
all. Any expenditure below the full £100,000 has no benefit for the person who develops 
the disease as, say, providing half of the cost of the yearly procedure necessary for 
                                                 
35 Another problem is that the argument is too limited in scope for the present task. It claims to show that 
equality and utility might be rendered consistent were equality of resources put into practice. But unity of 
value requires that values never conflict, even under unfavourable economic conditions. See Galston, The 
Practice of Liberal Pluralism, p. 174. 
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mobility is no better than providing none of it—unless the full cost is met, the procedure 
will not go ahead. I can of course assume this, as any example of values conflicting 
disproves the Dworkinian thesis of the unity of value. 
The question is, would people antecedently accept insurance? If they do, it is 
arguable that equality is satisfied, as inequality in resources and welfare is reduced. But it 
seems intuitively (and independently of my earlier description of utility) implausible to 
say that utility has been satisfied. After all, society has foregone £100,000 of income 
(divided between 99 of its members) for the sake of £5,000 of income (concentrated on 
one of its members). It has similarly foregone 99 units of welfare (divided between 99 of 
its members) for the sake of 4 units of welfare (concentrated in one of its members). 
Whether or not insurance should be taken out, it is clear that doing so does not maximize 
the amount of advantage in the society. 
What, then, if insurance is not taken out? In that case, utility is probably 
satisfied—welfare and resources have been promoted. But it is then intuitively (and 
independently of my earlier description of equality) implausible to say that equality has 
been satisfied. Society could have accepted the insurance increased the worst off’s 
income from £1,000 per annum to £6,000 per annum, and their welfare level from 5 to 1, 
both massive improvements to their lives which would also decrease (relative) inequality. 
The insurance would also have been recommended by one of Dworkin’s favoured 
measures of equality, the envy test.36 It can be assumed that the person with the disease 
would envy other people’s bundles of personal (e.g. money) and impersonal (e.g. 
                                                 
36 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, ch. 2. 
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marketable talent) resources.37 The envy test therefore recommends that resources are 
transferred to the person with the disease. But instead of improving the position of the 
worst off, and reducing inequality, and respecting the envy test, people have chosen to 
increase the benefits of the already advantaged. Whether or not insurance should be taken 
out, it is clear that not doing so is contrary to equality on any ordinary understanding. 
Thus, there is no policy that satisfies both equality and utility. 
Now Dworkinians might respond that I have, in the foregoing analysis, relied on 
‘ordinary’ understandings of equality and utility. The point, they may claim, is that we 
should revise these to fit with the results of hypothetical insurance markets. For instance, 
it might be claimed that equality should be measured by applying the envy test only ex 
ante to the distribution of diseases.38 But no reason to undertake such a revision of our 
ordinary view of equality is presented by considering hypothetical insurance markets. As 
I have already mentioned, there is nothing unsettling about equality and utility being in 
conflict, and that remains the case when we consider hypothetical insurance markets. 
Nothing feels out of place in my analysis of the choice to insure being the choice between 
an equal or advantage-maximizing distribution. It is the Dworkinian analysis of this 
result, which yields the conclusion that we can satisfy both equality and utility, that is 
problematic. It makes things easier than they can possibly be. 
Here is one last argument in support of that view. Consider this example:  
 
                                                 
37 For the distinction see Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 322-3. 
38 See Ronald Dworkin, “Sovereign Virtue Revisited,” Ethics, 113 (2002), 106-43; “Equality, Luck and 
Hierarchy.” 
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Insuredland and Uninsuredland. At t1 there are two identical countries facing the 
insurance decision described above. At t2 Insuredland insures and Uninsuredland 
does not. 
 
Neither of the possible unity of value analyses of Insuredland and Uninsuredland 
is plausible. It might be claimed that Insuredland fully satisfies the demands of equality 
and utility.39 But if Insuredland fully satisfied the demands of utility, then Uninsuredland 
can be no better as regards utility. And it is absurd to claim that it is no better from the 
perspective of utility to favour £5,000 over £100,000, and 4 units of welfare over 99. 
Alternatively, it might be claimed that Uninsuredland fully satisfies the demands of 
equality and utility. But if Uninsuredland fully satisfied the demands of utility, then 
Insuredland can be no better as regards equality. And it is absurd to claim that it is no 
better from the perspective of equality to favour £6,000 of income for the worst off to 
£1,000 of income for the worst off, 5 units of welfare for the worst off to 1 unit of 
welfare for the worst off, and a distribution rejected by the envy test to one recommended 
by the envy test. The inescapable conclusion is that Insuredland better realizes equality, 
and that Uninsuredland better realizes utility. Hypothetical insurance markets cannot 
salvage the Dworkinian claim that equality and utility do not conflict.  
 
II. IS UTILITY REALLY A VALUE? 
                                                 
39 To fully satisfy a value is to realize its ends as far as is presently possible. Unity of value requires that all 
values can be simultaneously fully satisfied. Merely partially satisfying one value, when there is some 
alternative that would fully satisfy it at the cost of decreased satisfaction of the other value, would expose 
the values as conflicting. 
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The above findings regarding equality and utility might be of little concern to Dworkin. 
His position appears to be that utility is not really a value. Thus Dworkin might favour a 
version of the second strategy for defending the unity of value that I mentioned in the 
introduction. Specifically, he might deny that there is a value conflict between equality 
and utility by saying that, though they conflict, utility is not a value.40 To see how he 
defends that view, I must first briefly set out his approach to appraising values. 
In Dworkin’s view, a legitimate government must endorse two fundamental 
principles: “First, it must show equal concern for every person over whom it claims 
dominion. Second, it must respect fully the responsibility and right of each person to 
decide for himself how to make something valuable of his life.”41 He even describes this 
as an “unchallengeable proposition.”42 I will not challenge the proposition here, so in that 
regard my critique of Dworkin is internal. Applied to distributive justice, this proposition 
requires the “simultaneous equation” of “find[ing] a solution that respects both the 
reigning principles of equal concern and personal responsibility.”43 Even when satisfying 
equal concern, we must satisfy personal responsibility, and vice versa.  
On what basis, then, might Dworkin deny that utility is a value? One line of 
argument considers a form of utilitarianism that is framed in putatively egalitarian 
                                                 
40 The other version of the second strategy is obviously closed to Dworkin, as he is committed to equality 
as a value; see the discussion below. 
41 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 2. 
42 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 422. 
43 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 3. 
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terms.44  On this view “we treat each person as an equal by valuing his pleasure (or 
happiness or welfare or success) equally in choosing policies that will increase the 
aggregate of pleasure (or one of those other commodities) in the community as a 
whole.”45 According to Dworkin, this view “offers an unpersuasive interpretation of 
equal concern.”46 Here is his argument for that conclusion in its entirety: 
 
Parents would not show equal concern for all their children if they spent their 
entire available budget educating only those who were likely to earn heavily in 
the market. That would not treat the success of each child’s life as equally 
important. Concern for a large group of persons is not the same as concern for its 
members one by one. Yes, an aggregation strategy values happiness or welfare or 
some other interpretation of utility, no matter in which person it resides. But that 
is concern for a commodity, not for a person.47 
 
The analogy with assigning a domestic educational budget seems to entirely miss 
the mark. Happiness is obviously not equivalent to mere money. It is not typically a 
means to an end. You would clearly lack equal concern if you invested in your children’s 
education with the sole goal of maximizing their earning potential—when this might 
mean that the one potential investment banker gets all the investment and the potential 
                                                 
44 See also Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), ch. 2. 
45 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 354. 
46 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 354. 
47 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 354. 
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teachers get nothing. But this says nothing about utilitarians, as they do not endorse this 
strange objective. 
The claim that “[c]oncern for a large group of persons is not the same as concern 
for its members one by one” might be true, but seems beside the point as the utilitarian 
does not claim only to show concern for the group. She claims also to show concern for 
each individual by, in Dworkin’s own words, “treat[ing] each person as an equal by 
valuing his pleasure (or happiness or welfare or success) equally.” It is true that the 
concern for the group and the concern for the individual are two sides of the same coin 
for the utilitarian, but that seems also to be the case for Dworkinian egalitarianism: its 
idea of showing equal concern to the group will just be respect for individual a, plus 
respect for b, plus respect for c, etc. Dworkin is an individualist, so his objection here 
cannot be that the group has a moral life of its own that the utilitarian overlooks. He may 
mean to gesture at a separateness of persons objection to utilitarianism, but that objection 
is typically directed at what Rawls calls “[t]he most natural way … of arriving at 
utilitarianism,” which “is to adopt for society as a whole the principle of rational choice 
for one man.”48 As Dworkin has made no reference to individual rationality in describing 
utilitarianism, and characterizes it as attempting to treat each person as an equal, it is hard 
to see how this objection might be relevant. 
The final part of Dworkin’s objection is more troubling for utilitarians and, by 
extension, those who endorse utility as a value. They might fairly complain that utility is 
not really a commodity. But while Dworkin’s choice of words here could have been 
better, his objection does not rely upon making utility into something that matters only 
                                                 
48 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 23-4. 
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instrumentally, like corn or oil. The utilitarian claim is essentially that equal concern 
consists in refusing to discriminate between persons when it comes to allocating utility. 
But the thing that is being maximized is utility itself, “no matter in which person it 
resides,” as Dworkin puts it. And at least sometimes, the effects of this maximization, 
even if it is motivated by a particular idea of what equal concern consists in, seems 
substantively unequal. Dworkin has mentioned a clear example of this in earlier work. 
Utilitarians can argue with great plausibility that racial discrimination would usually fail 
to maximize happiness, but they cannot plausibly claim that utilitarianism displays 
opposition to discrimination in principle, and in all conceivable cases.49 We might grant 
that utilitarianism shows concern for persons—after all, utilitarianism counts the 
happiness of every individual, and that people are happy is a legitimate concern—but 
there is a case for saying that it does not show equal concern for persons. The same 
follows, mutatis mutandis, for utility. 
Consider again the distributions in equality versus utility (2, 2; 1, 5). If the second, 
unequal distribution is selected, the worse off persons at least have an argument for 
saying that they have not been shown equal concern. Though no truly canonical 
definition of equal concern is provided, in other contexts Dworkin treats it in a way that 
suggests it might be inconsistent with the second distribution. It is described as showing 
“equal concern for fate,”50 which suggests a focus on a concern with how individuals end 
up, in contrast to the second, ‘full respect’ principle’s focus on the means taken to get 
there. In that vein, Dworkin imagines the first principle being invoked in critique of 
                                                 
49 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, pp. 290-1. 
50 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 2, see also p. 352. 
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laissez-faire policies, with a member of the poor pointing out that “[t]here are other, more 
regulatory and redistributive, sets of laws that would put me in a better position. How can 
government claim that this system shows equal concern for me?”51 Given the need to also 
take into account the second principle, the full complaint of “people with little market 
talent or bad luck” is that laissez-faire policy “does not show equal concern, because a 
different economic arrangement is available that also satisfies the requirements of 
individual responsibility and that shows more appropriate concern for them.”52 They 
might plausibly say the same if the second distribution is favoured in equality versus 
utility on utility grounds. 
I think that there is something to the worse off’s complaint here, but it is not the 
whole story about equal concern. There is a second aspect to equal concern. Consider 
what those who would be better off in the second distribution might say were the first, 
equal distribution chosen. In what way does the selection of the first distribution show 
equal concern for their fate? It gives them two units, when they would have had five 
under the other available distribution. The justification for this is that it is necessary to 
give the other group an extra benefit, creating outcome equality. But the size of that 
benefit is only one unit, compared to the loss of three units of benefit that the first 
distribution imposes on one group. At least where the worse off group under a 
distribution containing much more advantage is not badly off in absolute terms, the better 
off can fairly ask why three units of advantage for them counts for less than one unit of 
                                                 
51 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 3. 
52 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 363. 
 25 
advantage for the others. They can claim, with some plausibility, that they have been 
discriminated against when it comes to assigning benefits. 
These considerations suggest the following claim: 
 
The second aspect of equal concern: equal concern is not satisfied where small 
benefits for some individuals (the worse off) are brought about at the cost of 
losing big benefits for others (the better off).  
 
Equal concern, and even equal concern for fate, are ambiguous enough that they 
can be interpreted as praising the selection of less advantage more evenly distributed in 
one regard, as the first aspect of equal concern requires, and as criticising that selection in 
another regard, as the second aspect requires. 
The fox can accommodate both aspects of equal concern. His response to the 
objection that utilitarianism might conceivably have results, such as racial discrimination, 
which evidently do not show equal concern, is that it is more precise to say that it reflects 
only one aspect of equal concern. It is for that kind of reason that the best account does 
not endorse full-blown utilitarianism. My kind of fox, at least, endorses both equality and 
utility as conflicting values, each reflecting one aspect of equal concern. Though they 
conflict, in the sense that sometimes one recommends one course of action, the other 
another course of action, they are complementary in the sense that they act as constraints 
on each others’ excesses. Our concern with equality will ensure that there is no 
possibility of racial discrimination, just as our concern with utility ensures that the well-
being of the would-be better off is not disregarded. 
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The hedgehog may be appalled by this turn of events. The suggestion that equality 
and utility are values was bad enough, but now it is being claimed that this is because 
equal concern—a basis on which values are to be assessed—itself has two sides to it. 
What counterarguments might Dworkin advance here? A first, and obvious, strategy, 
given his general hostility to utilitarianism, would be to show that the second aspect of 
equal concern, which underpins the utility strand of the foxy position outlined above, is 
false. This approach says that the only valid complaint under the heading of equal 
concern comes where the worst off (or representatives) say “[t]here are other, more 
regulatory and redistributive, sets of laws that would put me in a better position. How can 
government claim that this system shows equal concern for me?” 
This view of equal concern as just a matter of maximizing the position of the 
worst off (maximining) is implausible both in general and, especially, as a defence of 
Dworkin’s position. Even if the reader is still drawn to maximining when considering 
equality versus utility (2, 2; 1; 5), it seems barely credible when considering ‘super 
equality versus utility’ cases (for instance, 2, 2; 1.9999, 10). Here maximin would be 
willing to forego a massive benefit for one group, for the sake of a barely noticeable 
benefit for another.53 Furthermore, Dworkin himself is committed to rejecting this 
monistic interpretation of equal concern. This is both in the obvious sense that he does 
not give maximin an explicit expression in his final principles, as Rawls famously does, 
                                                 
53 Were the ‘benefit’ merely instrumentally valuable, this might not seem unreasonable, as the benefit 
might then be subject to diminishing marginal returns, with the result that the transfer to the benefit of the 
worst off looks like better value. I should emphasize, then, that I use ‘benefit’ in a technical sense, as a 
placeholder for the reader’s favoured currency of justice—something which is presumably not merely 
instrumentally valuable and therefore not subject to diminishing marginal returns. 
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and the less obvious sense that Dworkin himself invokes a sense of equal concern which 
is relevantly similar to the second sense described above. In a discussion contrasting 
Rawls’ theory and his own, Dworkin argues that “a government that allows a much 
greater loss to fall on one citizen, in order to avert a much smaller loss for a second, 
would not be treating the former as an equal.”54 Similarly, in developing his own equality 
of resources, Dworkin asks whether this equality should be achieved ex post—that is, 
after the natural allocation of talents and disabilities, and the market allocation of 
resources and opportunities, have taken place. He objects that “the ex post approach, even 
so far as it is possible, is a very poor understanding of equal concern”.55 This is because 
“[a]ny community that undertook to spend all it could to improve the position of its blind 
or crippled members, for example, until further expenditure would not even marginally 
benefit them, would have nothing left to spend on anything else, and the lives of all other 
citizens would be miserable in consequence.”56 Clearly, Dworkin thinks that something 
other than how the worst off fare matters, as he objects to some expenditure that would 
benefit them. And the nature of his objection is very similar to that suggested by the 
second aspect of equal concern that I suggested above: a sole concern with the interests 
of the worst off will lead to disproportionate losses for the better off. His view seems, like 
mine, to say that equal concern is upset, in one regard, where small benefits for some 
individuals (the worse off) are brought about in favour of big benefits for others (the 
better off). 
                                                 
54 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 115. 
55 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 358. 
56 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 359. 
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Now it is obviously a further jump from there, and one which I need not make, to 
claim that there is a significantly utilitarian branch to Dworkin’s thinking here.57 
Although Dworkin may accept the general proposition of the second aspect of equal 
concern, he may say that, within his overall theory, some other aspect of equal concern—
the first aspect, or something similarly non-aggregative—has much more weight. On this 
view, it is only where very disproportionately large losses for the better off follow from 
benefitting the worst off that the overall theory disapproves. This, and no more, is 
certainly what is suggested by his rather bluntly stated example of the “blind or crippled.” 
The utilitarian, by contrast, thinks that the second aspect of equal concern is the only 
aspect. She always objects when small benefits for some individuals are brought about in 
favour of big benefits for others, even if the difference in the size of the two sets of 
benefits is small. 
But while Dworkin may invoke the second aspect of equal concern more 
cautiously than the utilitarian, that does not change the fact that he endorses the second 
aspect to some extent. And as he endorses the second aspect, it is not plausible that he 
can resist my foxy defence of equality and utility on the basis that this aspect is false. It 
might be thought that he could resist it by claiming that only his particular restricted form 
of the second aspect of equal concern is plausible, but this approach faces two problems. 
First, Dworkin presents no arguments for it, and there is no obvious way of developing it. 
Second, as I do not propose utilitarianism, but only an equality-utility hybrid, I need 
myself only endorse the second aspect of equal concern in a restricted form. Having 
                                                 
57 For Dworkin’s rebuttals of a similar suggestion, see Sovereign Virtue, pp. 110, 116, 349-50. 
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granted that the bigness of benefits sometimes outweighs their distribution, Dworkin 
grants too much for the first counterargument that we have been considering. 
I move on, then, to consider a second counterargument that Dworkin might—and 
in this case, actually does—use to resist the idea that utility is a value as equality is. In 
earlier work he writes that a utilitarianism justified on grounds of equal concern “cannot 
coherently offer to compromise highest average welfare over a given population in the 
name of wealth equality or simple welfare equality.”58 This is on the basis that “[t]reating 
people as equals, on the utilitarian’s conception of equality, demands the highest 
aggregate welfare, and one cannot coherently treat people other than as equals in the 
name of some deeper conception of equality.”59  
The wording of the final clause here is a little tricky. We should just set aside the 
notion that the non-utilitarian interpretation of equal concern is somehow ‘deeper’, as that 
is not part of the view I am defending—I treat equality and utility, and their respective 
supporting aspects of equal concern, as equally fundamental. I believe that the core of 
Dworkin’s objection is that the ‘partial utilitarian’ is, qua utilitarian, committed to 
maximizing welfare on equal concern grounds, but also, qua non-utilitarian, committed to 
not maximizing welfare on equal concern grounds, which he thinks is incoherent. But 
that is only an incoherent thought as long as we treat the two conflicting thoughts as 
absolute imperatives. If we instead say just that we have a pro tanto reason of equal 
concern to act in one way, and another pro tanto reason of equal concern to act in 
another, there is no incoherence: we just acknowledge that some non-conclusive but 
                                                 
58 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 274.  
59 Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, p. 274. 
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relevant considerations support one action and others support another, and try to balance 
them against each other to come up with a practical solution. To reiterate, that such a 
process may be difficult is, both logically and by Dworkin’s own lights, no evidence that 
there is indeterminacy about what it is best to do. Dworkin might reply that the 
incoherence here is not a general problem of conflict, but specifically to do with the fact 
that this is an alleged conflict within equal concern, which is impossible. But such a reply 
would both assume what needs to be shown (that conflict within values is impossible) 
and be inconsistent with the dualism of Dworkin’s own interpretation of equal concern. 
This brings us on to a third counterargument. Dworkin claims that “much energy 
has been wasted by the defeating assumption that liberty, equality and democracy are 
criterial concepts that can be explicated through some neutral analysis that makes no 
assumption about their value or importance.”60 It is this conception of equality that 
“encourages the dismissive view that equality means flat equality—everyone having the 
same wealth throughout their lives—because no other definition is plausible if we take 
equality to be criterial.”61 Now clearly I have been assuming a fairly strict conception of 
equality. Although I have allowed for the possibility of departures from equality on 
account of responsibility considerations, I have been committed to the notion that 
equality would not allow inequality for the sake of larger benefits for the better off. So 
Dworkin might claim that it is only by making equality a very uncompromising doctrine, 
which does not value benefits unless they fall to the worse off, that I have been able to 
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61 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 346. 
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show that equality needs a confederate such as utility. His ‘interpretative’ notion of 
equality, by contrast, builds in the full set of equal concern considerations. 
I can grant Dworkin this particular argument. If it succeeds, it only establishes 
Dworkin’s broader notion of equality as an alternative to an equality-utility combination. 
And establishing an alternative to a theory is not itself an argument against that theory. 
How might Dworkin provide the further argument to show that his alternative is better? 
One way is by appealing to Occam’s razor. Dworkin has one value, and I have 
two, so it might look like we should break any tie in favour of his theory, as it is simpler. 
But this is far from the truth. Though I have two values, they each have a relatively 
simple internal structure, while Dworkin’s is much more complex. Not only does he 
incorporate the same two kinds of considerations—corresponding to the two aspects of 
equal concern—that my overall theory appeals to in his one value, but his full theory has 
such complexities as hypothetical insurance markets, auctions, and the envy test, which 
do not have analogues in my theory.62 Although I doubt that it is a weighty consideration, 
parsimony, if anything, tells in favour of a combination of equality and utility. 
Another approach is to appeal to the fact that, on Dworkin’s view, equality is a 
value that should always be promoted, while in my view, equality’s prescriptions, though 
they are taken into account, will sometimes be overridden in practice. (This is certainly so 
in the ‘super equality versus utility’ cases that I mentioned earlier.) As equality is one of 
the great values of contemporary philosophy, and more importantly of modern societies, 
it might be thought a significant advantage of Dworkin’s theory that its allegiance to it is 
unconditional. 
                                                 
62 See especially Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, ch. 2. 
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But it is unclear why it would be a good thing that some notion that has wide 
acceptance can be rendered so that it never admits of exceptions. For the theorist, the 
really important questions when deciding which values to support, and how much support 
they should have, is how far true they are, and how much good they do. In trying to show 
that equality is worthy of unconditional support, a liberal such as Dworkin cannot 
plausibly cite the status it happens to have in support of its truth and goodness. 
I cannot, then, detect any good argument for Dworkin’s view to be preferable to 
my position on account of the former’s apparent denial of utility as a value. 
 
III. PROCRUSTES 
I have defended the fox’s thesis that true values may conflict, with special reference to 
distributive justice. My specific claims are (1) that equality and utility may conflict with 
each other, and (2) that they both genuinely are values. The first part of the article 
considered the possibility of denying (1), mostly using the materials Dworkin provides 
when attempting to resolve another value conflict. The second part of the article 
considered Dworkin’s apparent denial of (2), specifically taking the form of the claim 
that utility is not a value. I found that the resistance to both of my claims can be 
overcome, and so the fox escapes unscathed. 
 It is worth emphasizing that Dworkin defends a strong version of value holism. 
Weaker versions of hedgehoggery can accept my central claims. One such view accepts 
that there might be conflicts between values, but holds that these are resolved at a higher 
level of abstraction. For instance, a consequentialist might concede that the likes of 
honesty, kindness, and equality are genuine values that can conflict, while claiming that 
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there is a master value of Moorean good that conclusively resolves these conflicts.63 This 
view accepts my claims (1) and (2). The fox’s arguments against such a view would have 
to take a different form to those advanced here. 
Though Dworkin’s denial of value conflicts is a strong one, it retains some 
intuitive plausibility by retaining considerations typically associated with rival values. 
Most relevantly, while my view accommodates the first and second aspects of equal 
concern under the banners of equality and utility, Dworkin encompasses them under one 
expanded banner of equality. I will conclude by providing a brief sketch of a further 
argument that suggests that this position lacks a key advantage held by the fox.64 
 When we are confronted with a decision such as that of equality versus utility, we 
should be able to feel that we are pulled in two directions. There is something good about 
people on the whole faring better, and there is also something good about distributions 
being more equal. To deny that is to fail to recognize something that matters 
fundamentally. Dworkin acknowledges as much by appealing to both aspects of equal 
concern. So when we can have more advantage in our distribution, or more equality, but 
not both, we should feel at least a little conflicted, and we should be able to specify the 
source of that as a conflict between things that matter to us. The fox can have all of this: 
he may recognize equality and utility as values, he may feel some disappointment 
                                                 
63 See Donald Regan, “Value, Comparability, and Choice,” in Chang (ed), Incommensurability, 
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64 A similar argument is powerfully presented in Bernard Williams, “Liberalism and Loss,” in Mark Lilla, 
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(though as I said, not blame) when he cannot have much of both, and he may know that 
this is because, on this occasion, his values pull in opposite directions. 
 It is less clear how the hedgehog can tell a similar story. He does, of course, think 
that there is something good about distributions being more equal, and he also thinks 
there is, in some cases at least, something good about people on the whole faring better. 
But any explanation of what is happening in a situation where we can have one of these 
things, but not the other, must be strange. There is not a conflict between two values here, 
so what is there?  
Minow and Singer suggest that “[w]hat is at risk is sheer honesty about competing 
views and contrasting tugs on our perceptions and hearts.”65 This may slightly overstate 
the point. There can be a persisting conflict on the hedgehog’s view. But it must be within 
the value of equality. That is problematic in the first place because Dworkin seems to 
claim that such a conflict is incoherent. But even granting that there is such a conflict, the 
framework within which Dworkin must place it serves only to muddy the waters of moral 
discourse. For instance, if he wanted to give a principled explanation to congenitally 
disabled people of why it is that he is not going to give them a small benefit, because it 
comes at great cost to the rest of the community, what would he say? Dworkin might 
prefer to provide an explanation in terms of mechanisms such as the hypothetical 
insurance market, but these are not plausibly themselves values: they are just ways of 
thinking about the implications of values. On Dworkin’s view, such an explanation boils 
down to this: we are selecting a more unequal distribution rather than a more equal one 
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of Justice,” Boston University Law Review, 90 (2010), 903-920, p. 907.  
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for the sake of equality.66 This adds insult to injury—the involuntarily worst off are not 
only denied resources, but in the name of the value on which they thought they could 
rely. 
Imagine a disabled person trying to formulate a response. Were the policy enacted 
by a fox, she could have said “you hold that equality has the weighting x and utility has 
the weighting y, but I propose that the justified weighting of utility is only z.” This is a 
clear and, as Dworkin says, familiar picture. But to the hedgehog, she has to say 
something like “you hold that equality type 1 has the weighting x and equality type 2 has 
the weighting y, but I propose that the justified weighting of equality type 2 is only z.” 
We should not rule out such revisionary treatment of concepts, but for them to be 
attractive we must first be shown that something was wrong with the more familiar 
conflict between equality and utility. We have not been shown that. 
These points are reinforced by revisiting Insuredland and Uninsuredland. On 
Dworkin’s view (as opposed to the Dworkinian view I considered earlier in relation to 
this case, which recognized utility as a value), one or other of Insuredland and 
Uninsuredland fully satisfies equality, and utility does not come into the picture. Suppose 
that it is Insuredland that satisfies Dworkin’s equality. In that case, a member of society 
who does not develop the disease, and who opposes the insurance premiums, cannot 
claim, if she is to address questions of value, that utility has been unduly overlooked. She 
must rather claim that equality type 2 has been unduly overlooked. But this seems 
                                                 
66 Were the disabilities in the example the result of choice, Dworkin might have been able to appeal to the 
second fundamental principle—that of full respect for responsibility. But it is specified that the disabilities 
are congenital and as such involuntary. 
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misleading as, intuitively, her claim does not seem to concern equality at all. She wants 
those who are better off already to be even better off. It seems much more intuitively 
sound to describe her objection as one from utility. If the person with the disease 
responds to her that the premiums should continue to be paid as equality should take 
precedence, that seems like a coherent response, not a category mistake as Dworkin has 
it.  
Dworkin anticipates the worry “that [y]ou might think me Procrustes, stretching 
and lopping conceptions of the great political virtues so that they neatly fit each other. I 
would then be achieving unity on the cheap: a meaningless victory.”67 He assures us that 
he “mean[s] to submit each of the political conceptions I describe to the test of 
conviction. I will not rely on any assumption that a theory is sound just because it fits 
with other theories we also find agreeable.”68 This assurance notwithstanding, I suggest 
that, as regards equality, Dworkin’s thought has this procrustean quality, which is 
attributable to his apparent denial of utility’s value. My combination of equality and 
utility may, then, be superior in one regard, and as we saw earlier, inferior in none. 
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